

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L COPENHAGEN 0785

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, EEC, DA

SUBJECT: FURTHER DANISH VIEWS ON EC SUMMIT

REF: COPENHAGEN 0756

SUMMARY: THE POLITICAL SIDE OF THE DANISH FOREIGN
MINISTRY IS DEFINITELY PLEASED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE
BRITISH RENEGOTIATION ISSUE BUT IS BEGINNING TO SPECULATE
ABOUT THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR DENMARK IF, AS IS NOT ANTICI-
PATED, THE BRITISH REFERENDUM SHOULD GO WRONG. THE DANES
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DO NOT LIKE THE TERM "EUROPEAN COUNCIL" TO DESCRIBE HEADS

OF GOVERNMENT MEETINGS BECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT AT THE TIME OF ENTRY NOT TO GO BEYOND THE STRUCTURAL TERMS OF THE TREATY OF ROME. THEY ALSO DO NOT LIKE SESSIONS WITH ONLY MINISTERS PRESENT. END SUMMARY.

1. IN A MEETING WITH THE DCM ON MARCH 17 KORSGAARD-PEDERSEN (K-P) WHO IS IN CHARGE OF THE FIRST POLITICAL OFFICE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY (NORTH AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS), EXPANDED ON THE VIEWS WE HAD EARLIER OBTAINED FROM UNDER SECRETARY JENS CHRISTENSEN ON THE DUBLIN SUMMIT (REFTEL). (BECAUSE OF THE PECULIAR ARRANGEMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY -- TWO MINISTERS BUT ONLY ONE MINISTRY -- CHRISTENSEN REFLECTS THE VIEWS OF HIS MINISTER, IVAR NORGAAARD, WHO IS IN CHARGE OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, WHILE K-P REFLECTS THE VIEWS OF FOREIGN MINISTER K. B. ANDERSEN.)

2. BRITISH MEMBERSHIP -- LIKE CHRISTENSEN K-P STATED THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN A SUCCESS IN THAT IT ACCOMPLISHED ITS PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF AGREEMENT ON THE TERMS OF BRITISH RENEGOTIATION. NOTWITHSTANDING THIS FAVORABLE RESULT, HE SAID, A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONTINGENCY THINKING HAS BEGUN IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AS TO WHAT DENMARK WOULD DO IF THE BRITISH REFERENDUM TURNED OUT NEGATIVE. A NUMBER OF POINTS ARE ALREADY CLEAR: (A) IF THE REFERENDUM IS FAVORABLE TO MEMBERSHIP, THE WHOLE QUESTION BECOMES ACADEMIC IN DENMARK; (B) IF THE BRITISH VOTE THEMSELVES OUT, THERE WILL BE A REFERENDUM IN DENMARK; AND (C) THE GOVT WOULD DO ALL IT COULD NOT TO HAVE THIS REFERENDUM HELD WITHIN A SHORT TIME AFTER THE BRITISH VOTE. ON THIS LATTER POINT, K-P EXPLAINED THAT THE GOVT WOULD NOT WANT TO RISK AN EMOTIONAL CARRY-OVER FROM A BRITISH VOTE AND WOULD WANT TO HOLD ANY DANISH REFERENDUM AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF WHATEVER ASSOCIATION TERMS THE BRITISH WERE ABLE TO MAKE FOR THEMSELVES WITH THE EC. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT A DANISH REFERENDUM WOULD BE HELD WITHIN A YEAR AFTER THE BRITISH REFERENDUM AND THE TIME FRAME MAY BE STRETCHED OUT MUCH LONGER. WHILE THE PRESENT SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC GOVT FAVORS CONTINUING DANISH MEMBERSHIP -- IT WAS, AFTER ALL, THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS WHO LED DENMARK INTO THE EC -- NO ONE COULD GUARANTEE WHAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE GOVT WOULD BE

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FOLLOWING A NEGATIVE BRITISH DECISION. K-P SAID HE COULD IMAGINE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IF THE BRITISH WERE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE VERY FAVORABLE TERMS OF ASSOCIATION WITH THE EC, WHICH HE DID NOT REGARD AS LIKELY, AND IF DANISH MEMBERSHIP CAME TO APPEAR TO SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION TO BE A BURDEN RATHER THAN A BENEFIT, THE GOVT MIGHT TAKE A DIFFERENT POSITION. THERE ARE MANY DANES, HE NOTED, WHO LOOK RATHER ENVIOUSLY, IF WITHOUT MUCH DETAILED KNOWLEDGE, AT THE SITUATION OF NORWAY.

ILLOGICAL AS IT IS, THIS TYPE OF ROMANTIC THINKING CAN HAVE A CERTAIN INFLUENCE AT THE TIME OF A REFERENDUM. HOWEVER, K-P SUMMED UP, HE WAS HEARTENED BY RECENT POLLS FROM THE U.K. AND, DESPITE THIS ADMITTEDLY CONTINGENCY THINKING, WAS GOING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE BRITISH WOULD OPT TO REMAIN IN.

3. CSCE -- K-P SAID THAT THE DANES WERE PLEASED WITH THE DUBLIN DECLARATION ON CSCE WHICH THEY THOUGHT STRUCK JUST THE PROPER NOTE. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT MADE ANY APPROACH HERE ALONG THE LINES OF THE BREZHNEV LETTER. PERSONALLY, HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WERE A LITTLE OBVIOUS AND A LITTLE TACTLESS IN CHOOSING TO SEND LETTERS TO ONLY FIVE NATO MEMBERS. THIS DID NOT SIT WELL WITH THE SMALLER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE, HE SAID; IT WOULD HAVE TAKEN LITTLE EXTRA EFFORT FOR BREZHNEV TO SEND LETTERS TO THE OTHER NATO HEADS OF GOVT AND THUS AVOID THIS SEEMING SNUB.

4. INSTITUTIONALIZATION -- ASKED WHAT THE DANISH ATTITUDE WAS TOWARD THE DUBLIN TYPE OF MEETING, K-P REPLIED THAT IT WAS "NOT WITHOUT PROBLEMS" FOR THE DANES. AS EVERYONE KNOWS, HE SAID, THE DANES HAD ALWAYS PUT DIFFERING EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COOPERATION IN EUROPE. THEY HAD VOTED TO JOIN THE EC ON THE PROMISE OF THE THEN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC GOVT THAT THEIR COOPERATION WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE TERMS OF THE ROME TREATY. NOW THAT THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS ARE AGIN IN POWER, WITH MANY OF THE SAME MINISTERS WHO LED DENMARK INTO THE EC, THE QUESTION OF THE DIVISION BETWEEN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AREAS AND COOPERATION IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS HAS AGAIN ARISEN. (IN THE PARLIAMENTARY FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE MARCH 18, FONMIN ANDERSEN SAID: "IT IS CLEAR THAT THE TWO SETS OF PROBLEMS ARE INTERRELATED; AND IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF EC CO-OPERATION THEY ARE DEALTH WITH ON THE BASIS OF CONFIDENTIAL

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IDFFERENT PROCEDURES.") THIS WAS THE BASIC REASON FOR THE DANISH DISLIKE OF THE TERM "EUROPEAN COUNCIL." THEY STILL PREFER THE TERM "HEADS OF GOVERNMENT." THEY WERE ALSO UNHAPPY ABOUT THE FORMAT OF THE RECENT MEETING, PARTICULARLY IN THAT KEY OFFICIALS WERE KEPT OUT OF THE MINISTERS' DISCUSSIONS. IN MANY CASES THIS REQUIRED THE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO BE NOTE-TAKERS AND, K-P ADDED RUEFULLY, THEY WERE NOT VERY PRACTISED IN THAT REGARD. THE SUBJECTS BEING DISCUSSED WERE FREQUENTLY COMPLEX AND MINISTERS ON OCCASION DID NOT PICK UP THE NUANCE OR DETAILS WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN HELFUL TO THEIR STAFFS. THE DANES WOULD ALSO LIKE TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT SUMMIT MEETINGS ARE PREARED IN WHAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER A MORE ORDERLY MANNER. FOR ONE THING, A SIFFUCIENT NUMBER OF COMMON FACTS SHOULD BE PUT BEFORE THE MINISTERS, AND THIS COULD PROBABLY BEST BE DONE BY THE COMMISSION. FURTHERMORE,

ACCORDING TO K-P, CERTAIN COUNTRIES HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL (AND POLITICAL) LIMITS AS TO THE DECISIONS THEIR MINISTERS CAN TAKE WITHOUT CABINET CONSULTATION, AND HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS ALSO ARGUED FOR INCLUDING KEY OFFICIALS IN THE MEETINGS. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT THE NINE WILL HAVE TO "NEGOTIATE THE MODALITIES" OF FUTURE MEETINGS ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING SANGUINE THAT THE DANISH VIEWS WOULD PREVAIL. ONE RAY OF HOPE IN THIS REGARD WAS THAT THERE WILL BE THREE HEADS OF GOVT MEETINGS PER ANNUM IN THE FUTURE, ONE IN THE CAPITAL OF EACH PRESIDENCY AND A SUMMER ONE IN BRUSSELS. AT LEAST IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE SOME OF THE DANISH DESIRES, SAY WITH REALTION TO COMMISSION PARTICIPATION, TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT DURING THE SUMMITS IN BRUSSELS.

5. COMMENT: DENMARK'S RELATIONS WITH THE EC ARE HANDLED BY NORGAAARD AS MINISTER FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. K.B. ADNERSEN IS, HOWEVER, NOT PREPARED TO LET ALL THE RUNNING TO HIS RIVAL AND THIS CAN CREATE THE AWKWARD SITUATION OF TWO MINISTERS TRYING TO SIT ON ONE CHAIR AS THEY DID AT DUBLIN. HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICIALS WORKING UNDER BOTH MINISTERS THAT THE DANES ARE SATISFIED WITH THE SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME OF THE DUBLIN MEETING BUT THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO AGITATE FOR CHANGES IN FORM. IT IS OF INTEREST THAT IN HIS COMMENTS K-P DID NOT, EXCEPT IN THE BREZHNEV LETTER CONTEXT, COMPLAIN THAT THE SUMMIT WAS DOMINATED BY THE LARGER MEMBERS (BONN 4345 AND EC BRUSSELS 2348), ALTHOUGH CONFIDENTIAL

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THIS POINT HAD BEEN NOTED BY CHRISTENSEN WHO IS OF COURSE MORE ATTUNED TO THE EC'S ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES. ON THE MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION OF BRITISH (AND DANISH) MEMBERSHIP, THERE IS CONTINUING OPTIMISM, TEMPERED ONLY BY THE REALIZATION THAT THE MOOD OF AN ELECTORATE CAN BE FICKLE. IN AN ARTICLE IN POLITIKEN ON MARCH 16 NORGAAARD SAID EVEN THOUGH DENMARK WOULD HAVE TO PAY SOMETHING EXTRA AS A RESULT OF THE DUBLIN AGREEMENT "THAT MUST BE VIEWED AS A MODEST CONTRIBUTION IN RELATION TO DENMARK'S INTEREST IN THE CONTINUATION OF BRITISH MEMBERSHIP." HE ADDED THAT DENMARK WOULD CONTINUE ACTIVELY TO SUPPORT BRITISH EFFORTS TO REMAIN IN THE EC. WHAT INFLUENCE THE DANISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC LEADERS WILL HAVE ON THEIR LABOUR PARTY COLLEAGUES IN BRITAIN CANNOT BE ASSESSED FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT BUT IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE DANES WILL BE STRONGLY URGING, BOTH PUBLICLY HERE AND PRIVATELY WITH TIER BRITISH FREINDS, A FAVORABLE VOTE. CROWE

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